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The magnitude of the nation's hazardous waste problem is staggering.'
To provide broad federal authority to prevent or remedy releases of haz-
ardous substances from the growing number of abandoned sites, Congress
enacted in 1980 the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA).2 The Act created a $1.6 billion
"Superfund" 3 that enabled the government to clean up contaminated sites
and that authorized it to hold parties responsible for cleanup costs." The
1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA)5 provided
an $8.5 billion replenishment to address the increasing number of poten-
tial Superfund sites.6 Courts have construed CEROLA to impose strict,7
joint and several,' and retroactive9 liability on responsible parties. They
also have restricted the use of the affirmative defenses provided by
CERCLA.1 °
An "owner or operator" of a facility is a potentially responsible party
under CERCLA's liability provisions. The term "owner or operator"
1. See, e.g., Superfund: Looking Back, Looking Ahead, EPA J., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 13, 17 (esti-
mating that United States had roughly 9,000 problem hazardous waste sites in 1980).
2. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified in part as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). Congress defines "hazardous substance" at 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(14) (Supp. IV 1986).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (Supp. IV 1986)).
4. CERCLA defines responsible parties as present and past owners or operators of contaminated
sites, generators of hazardous substances sent to such sites, and transporters of hazardous substances
who selected such sites. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (Supp. IV 1986). To recover costs from these
parties, the government must establish that the site is a facility from which a release or threatened
release of any hazardous substance occurred that caused the United States to incur response costs. Id.
5. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp.
IV 1986)).
6. The United States General Accounting Office has found as many as 425,380 potential
Superfund sites. See 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2043 (Jan. 22, 1988). Corrective action for only 2,500 of
these could cost more than $22 billion. Id.
7. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072-73 (D. Colo. 1985).
10. See, e.g., Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1048-49 (third-party defense denied to defendant).
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1986) provides a third-party defense to liability where the defend-
ant establishes that the release or threatened release was caused solely by an act or omission of a third
party other than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship.
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means "in the case of [a] . .. facility, any person owning or operating
such facility . . . .Such term does not include a person, who, without
participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facil-
ity.""1 Thus, Congress provided an exception to liability as an "owner or
operator" of a contaminated site for persons, such as financial institutions,
who hold "indicia of ownership" to protect their security interests and
who do not "participat[e] in the management" of the sites. Because CER-
CLA was hastily drafted and adopted, with resulting ambiguities left un-
clarified by the sparse legislative history, 2 it is unclear when lenders hold
"indicia of ownership" and have not "participated in [ ] management" to
be protected under the above "security interest exemption."' 3
SARA indicates that Congress intended to hold a mortgagee who fore-
closes on a contaminated site liable for cleanup costs as the fee owner of
the property. 14 By barring protection under the security interest exemp-
tion to foreclosing mortgagees, Congress attempted to encourage banks to
investigate before lending to parties who handle hazardous wastes."5 Ac-
cordingly, banks would then also monitor the debtor's site during the loan
period to avoid holding an interest in contaminated collateral.16
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
12. See 126 CONG. REC. 31,969 (1980) (statement of Rep. Broyhill).
13. In describing the exemption to liability as an "owner," the legislative history states:
[The term "owner"] does not include certain persons possessing indicia of ownership (such as
a financial institution) who, without participating in the management or operation of a vessel
or facility, hold title either in order to secure a loan or in connection with a lease financing
arrangement under the appropriate banking laws, rules, or regulations.... [A] financial insti-
tution which held title primarily to secure a loan but also received tax benefits as the result of
holding title would not be an "owner" as long as it did not participate in the management or
operation of the vessel or facility.
H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 36, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6160, 6181.
14. In 1986, Congress amended the term "owner or operator" to exclude from liability state or
local governments that "acquired ownership or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delin-
quency, abandonment," or similar means, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (Supp. IV 1986), and to hold
liable "any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at [the] facility immediately
beforehand," 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). The fact that Congress did not at the same
time amend the term also to exclude from liability lenders who acquire property through foreclosure
indicates that it intended to hold them liable as owners. See Vollmann, Double Jeopardy: Lender
Liability Under Superfund, 16 REAL EsT. L.J. 3, 11 (1987).
15. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)-(B) (Supp. IV 1986) provides an "innocent land-
owner" defense that works in tandem with the third-party defense to protect owners who did not
know or had no reason to know the site was contaminated at the time of purchase. Because the "due
diligence" standards that defendants must exercise under this provision to discover whether a site is
contaminated are extremely rigorous for commercial entities, the defense acts in effect as a means of
creating incentives for safer waste handling and disposal. See Brandt, Contaminated Collateral: A
New Subspecialty, AM. LAw., Oct. 1986, at 10 (upshot of innocent landowner provision is to en-
courage foreclosing mortgagees to conduct more environmental audits).
16. A bank may avoid liability as an owner by not foreclosing on a polluted site if the cleanup
costs exceed the value of the collateral, thereby losing only the value of the collateral. It also may
foreclose after government cleanup; however, a federal lien for reimbursement will encumber the
property. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1) (Supp. IV 1986). Moreover, if the lender forecloses on a site, and thus
becomes an owner, it is obligated under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) to inform subsequent purchasers of
environmental problems that occurred at the site. Thus, the lender may face great difficulty in selling
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CERCLA and SARA, however, leave lenders uncertain as to how
much participation is required before a lender loses protection under the
security interest exemption. A lender's control over a site's operations
short of foreclosure could lead to liability as an operator. Congress did not
elaborate on the meaning of "participating in the management" in the
security interest exemption or in legislative history.17 Courts have not yet
developed a predictable method of determining when lenders will be liable
as operators under CERCLA.1 Liability for cleanup costs could run to
hundreds of thousands of dollars and exceed the amount of the loan. 9
Without clear standards defining the degree of control a lender can safely
exercise over the debtor's operations, banks will be deterred from monitor-
ing sites.20
Yet banks could greatly advance CERCLA's goals, particularly that of
safe waste disposal, by assisting financially troubled debtors with potential
environmental problems. Wary that they could hold contaminated collat-
eral and be liable as the owner of a facility if they foreclose, banks already
have been investigating debtors' sites before lending.2 Although society
benefits when banks examine facilities before lending, it can further bene-
fit from the monitoring role that banks normally play during the loan
term. For example, banks can examine the potential liability and solvency
of a debtor with environmental problems, suggest that it hire experts to
solve them, and disburse the funds needed to work them out, rather than
declare a default hastily. But if lenders are unable to predict the scope of
potential liability they may incur as constructive operators of the site, they
property encumbered with a lien for cleanup costs.
17. Congress, however, did comment on the meaning of "operator" in the legislative history. This
sheds light on the minimum that could be meant by "participating in the management," since man-
agement participation would apply only to deny a lender protection under the security interest exemp-
tion where liability as an operator was already established. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying
text.
18. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,995 (E.D. Pa.
1985) ("difficulty arises . . . in determining how far a secured creditor may go in protecting its
financial interests before it can be said to have acted as an owner or operator within the meaning of
[CEROLA]").
19. See, e.g., United States' Memorandum in Support of Its Second Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint at 19, United States v. Nicolet, No. 85-3060 (E.D. Pa. filed Nov. 22, 1988) (parent com-
pany/mortgagee being sued for $2.5 million in response costs); United States v. Maryland Bank &
Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 575-76, 582 (D. Md. 1986) (cleanup costs exceeded outstanding loan).
20. See Burcat, Foreclosure and United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.: Paying the Piper
or Learning How to Dance to a New Tune?, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,098, 10,099
(1987) (banks will avoid assisting debtors whose sites are connected with hazardous waste activity for
fear of CERCLA liability); Chang, Toxic Waste Worries Grow Among Lenders, Regulators, Mort-
gage Commentary, Aug. 19, 1988, at 1 (noting irony that the more lenders do to prevent contamina-
tion of properties to which they hold liens, the more likely they are to be stuck with bill).
21. See, e.g., Flagg, Toxic Waste Pockets Make Property Buyers Step Carefully; Costly Surprises
May Lurk in Buildings, Underground, L.A. Times, Aug. 28, 1988, § 4 (Business), at 7, col. 1 (to
satisfy lenders, developers must go through "incredible hoops" to buy piece of property); Crain, Toxic
Cleanup Liability Forces Lenders to Tighten Up, Den. Bus. J., June 6, 1988, § 1, at 15 (lenders are
playing larger role in society, and are police force for hazardous materials; they are writing into loan
commitments mandatory environmental audits and extensive ownership and usage histories on all
commercial properties under financing consideration).
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will refrain from aiding borrowers; moreover, they may simply choose not
to lend." Without capital, businesses cannot afford to implement the
waste reduction practices necessary to protect public health and the
environment. 23
A narrow interpretation of the phrase "participating in the manage-
ment" in the security interest exemption could encourage banks to moni-
tor waste sites. Such an interpretation would benefit both banks and soci-
ety: Banks would be more willing to engage in workouts to recover loans
and thus would be more likely to ensure that small waste problems do not
increase; at the same time, society would benefit because banks could help
prevent future environmental harms through diligent monitoring. A broad
construction of management participation, though consistent with the ex-
pansive interpretations generally given to CERCLA's liability provisions,
would be short-sighted. It would discourage banks from monitoring and
deprive society of further benefits that banks could provide during the
loan term.2 4 Moreover, a policy of imposing liability on banks because
they are "deep pockets" is not supported by the statute, which explicitly
exempts secured creditors from liability under certain conditions.25
This Note proposes that courts applying CERCLA look to guidelines
developed under analogous doctrines of lender liability in order to give
shape to the scope of permissible involvement by banks in the activities of
their borrowers. Section I sets out the current liability standards, discusses
the need to develop the meaning of management participation to en-
courage monitoring, and explains why lenders are effective at monitoring
their borrowers' environmental health. Section II provides a framework
for interpreting the meaning of management participation by reference to
the doctrines of equitable subordination and alter ego.26 Through a cumu-
lative test approach-a standard that looks to total domination rather than
to a checklist of actions-these established doctrines can provide certainty
by depicting the circumstances that have and have not led to findings of
lender management control. With the confidence that they will not be held
22. See Burcat, Environmental Liability of Creditors: Open Season on Banks, Creditors, and
Other Deep Pockets, 103 BANKING L.J. 509, 539 (1986); Business Operators Advised to Take Notice
of Liability Under Environmental Regulations, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 445 (May 22, 1987) (quoting
Thomas M. McMahon, Chicago attorney).
23. U.S. GN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE: ISSUES SURROUNDING INSURANCE
AVAILABILITY 31 (Oct. 1987).
24. See Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutions for Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs
Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 139, 180-81 (if courts could give narrower reading to term
"management," lenders could influence borrowers' hazardous waste activities, a result more beneficial
to lender, borrower, and society).
25. This has been recognized judicially. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,996 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
26. Courts have interpreted CERCLA to impose strict, joint and several, and retroactive liability.
See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. Thus, common law standards can be used to construe
management participation. Burcat, supra note 22, at 528-31, 533, also notes the potential utility of
alter ego doctrine and agency law principles.
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responsible for their borrowers' waste disposal practices under certain cir-
cumstances, banks will have a stronger incentive to lend prudently and to
monitor diligently during the loan period, thereby advancing the goals of
CERCLA.
I. LENDERS AS OPERATORS UNDER CERCLA
A. Current Liability Standards
Only one case so far has substantively addressed the problem of inter-
preting the term "participating in the management" under the security
interest exemption.27 In United States v. Mirabile, the court held on mo-
tions for summary judgment that a hazardous waste site owner's secured
creditors, including one who foreclosed on the site, could be held liable for
response costs only if they were involved in thefacility's operational, pro-
duction, or waste disposal activities.2" The court did not construe "partici-
pating in the management" literally, but distinguished financial decision-
making from it. Mirabile defined the financial ability to control business
practices as management of the affairs of the site's actual owner or opera-
tor,29 the exercise of which would not give rise to CERCLA liability. The
court did not explain exactly what constituted management participation
and financial control, but discussed the activities of the three creditor de-
27. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,994. For a discussion of one case that
recently commented on lender management participation under CERCLA, see infra note 32. In In re
T.P. Long Chemical Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 288-89 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985), another lender liability
case, the court found that the secured creditor had been totally removed from management, and there-
fore did not discuss the meaning of management participation under CERCLA. United States v.
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986), focused on whether a foreclosing
mortgagee was an owner of the site, but did not consider how a lender could be deemed an operator.
There have been few lender liability cases so far, mainly because the federal government has not
pursued banks as a class the way it has pursued other potentially responsible parties listed under
CERCLA's liability provisions. The government will bring an action against a bank when it believes
that it has a valid reason and that the law is on its side: for example, when a problem site exists, the
actual owner or operator cannot be found or is insolvent, the bank can be found and is solvent, and
the bank acted in a way that could make it liable under CERCLA. For example, the Department of
Justice has sued a lienholder of the assets of a bankrupt cloth printing company for response costs
incurred, alleging that the secured lender controlled the company after the plant had already closed
and thus is liable as an "owner or operator" when asbestos was released during the liquidation of
assets. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., No. 687-070, order at 12-13 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 22, 1988)
(denying cross-motions for summary judgment by United States and Fleet Factors); see infra note 32
(discussing interpretation of management participation by court in Fleet Factors). See also United
States' Memorandum in Support of Its Second Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint at 10, 18,
United States v. Nicolet, Inc., No. 85-3060 (E.D. Pa. filed Nov. 22, 1988) (alleging that mortgagee,
who is also former corporate parent of polluter, is liable as owner or operator); cf. Coastal Casting
Serv., Inc. v. Aron, No. H-86-4463 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database) (pre-
sent owner/operator alleging that lender is responsible for cleanup as past owner/operator; lender's
motion to dismiss denied to permit discovery). The lack of a predictable standard may result in in-
creased litigation on the issue of management participation and may deter banks who are still in active
relationships with their debtors from monitoring sites and encouraging safe disposal practices.
28. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,995.
29. Id. at 20,995-96.
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fendants and whether those activities could be considered management
participation."0
Using principles of financial control and management participation, the
court found that the activities of the foreclosing mortgagee, which had
secured a building on the debtor's site against vandalism, inquired about
the cost of disposing the property's drums, and visited the site occasionally
to show it to prospective purchasers, were prudent and routine steps to
secure the property against further depreciation. 1 On the other hand, the
court denied the other secured creditor's motion for summary judgment,
stating that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the bank agent
who was on the debtor's advisory board engaged in the sort of manage-
ment participation that would bring the bank within the scope of CER-
CLA liability. It also suggested that insistence on certain manufacturing
changes, reassignment of personnel, demand for additional sales efforts,
determining the order in which orders were filled, and weekly site visita-
tions might be characterized as involvement in the site's "day-to-day
operations."32
Although Mirabile's result appears reasonable, the court's fact-based
approach does not provide the predictability banks need to continue to
lend. A strict liability approach for banks could provide such certainty,
but would be inconsistent with the purposes of the statute: Banks cannot
be potentially responsible parties unless they are owners or operators.
30. For instance, one bank described its involvement as "monitoring the cash collateral accounts,
ensuring that receivables went to the proper account, and establishing a reporting system between the
company and the bank." Id. at 20,997. The court reasoned that "this sort of activity would not give
rise to CERCLA liability." Id. Because the debtor, a paint manufacturing company, disposed of
hazardous wastes as an incident to its business operations, the court also limited its ruling "to finan-
cial institutions which provide funds to entities which dispose of hazardous wastes as a result of their
business operations." Id. at 20,996 n.5.
31. The court also exempted from liability a secured creditor that provided "management assis-
tance" including frequent visitations to the site to monitor liquidation of assets, required creditor
approval prior to execution of contracts for management consulting services, and restricted certain
financial dealings. Id. at 20,996. Because the secured creditor was the Small Business Administration,
it is uncertain whether the court would have ruled the same way were the creditor not a government
entity.
32. Id. at 20,997. In denying cross-motions for summary judgment in Fleet Factors, Judge Bowen
stated:
I interpret the phrases "participating in the management of a... facility" and "primarily to
protect his security interest," to permit secured creditors to provide financial assistance and
general, and even isolated instances of specific, management advice to its debtors without risk-
ing CERCLA liability if the secured creditor does not participate in the day-to-day manage-
ment of the business or facility either before or after the business ceases operation.
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., No. 687-070, order at 10 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 22, 1988) (emphasis in
original).
Although the court could not extensively comment on what specific lender activities would consti-
tute management participation, its judgment does support the propositions set forth in Mirabile. For
instance, it found that the secured lender's pre-auction activities-refusing to advance additional funds
because of an overadvanced account, collecting accounts receivable assigned to it, and checking on the
credit of the debtor's customers before shipment of goods-did not rise to the level of participation in
management to impose CERCLA liability. The disputed facts as to whether the lender was an
"owner or operator" when asbestos was alleged to have been released during the liquidation of assets
led the court to deny cross-motions for summary judgment by the United States and the lender.
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Moreover, a broad liability standard would undermine CEROLA's goal
of preventing future harm to the environment, as banks would be deterred
from monitoring debtors involved in hazardous waste management.
B. The Need to Encourage Monitoring
Because a goal of CERCLA is to promote safe hazardous waste han-
dling and disposal, courts should interpret the statute in a way that does
not discourage banks from deterring reckless disposal practices. To en-
courage banks to become monitors, courts should adopt a high and pre-
dictable threshold of liability for banks.33 Under a low liability threshold,
the lender would quickly sever its relationship with a financially dis-
tressed debtor, accelerate loan payments, and try to recover the debt.34
Under such a scenario, all parties are worse off: the debtor cannot afford
to dispose of wastes properly, the lender may not fully recover the loan,
and the environment will suffer until the government shoulders the
cleanup costs. Such a result is precisely what CERCLA's liability provi-
sions are designed to avoid.35
C. Lenders as Quasi-EPA Monitors
This Note argues that lenders are effective monitors of the environmen-
tal health of their debtors. Expertise and the ability to spread risks are
considerations that determine which parties make effective monitors. 6
Lenders, insurance companies, and the federal government are the possi-
ble candidates to monitor hazardous waste sites. Of the three, lenders are
optimal because they have both the expertise to monitor the economic and
environmental health of their debtors and the ability to spread the risks of
cleanup costs. Although debtors are better risk avoiders because they can
mitigate or prevent hazardous waste releases at the lowest cost, lenders,
who are risk-averse, can insure against the risk more efficiently.
First, lenders are expert monitors: It is their business, and it furthers
their interests, to collect information about debtors' operations before lend-
33. A low threshold of liability also could provide predictability, but is undesirable because banks
would be deterred from monitoring the environmental health of their debtors. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Soriano & Lockett, Hazardous Waste Liability: The Emerging Problem for Lend-
ers, 12 CHEM. WAsTsE LrrIGATION REP. 47, 59 (1986) (current liability interpretation may force
lenders to push borrowers handling hazardous wastes into bankruptcy rather than risk potential lia-
bility by engaging in normal workouts).
35. See Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste
Cleanup, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 1261, 1295 (1987) (ambiguity of "participating in the management"
term will impede lenders who wish to monitor debtor's use of security property; this result conflicts
with CEROLA's purpose of encouraging private parties to involve themselves in safer waste disposal
and to assist debtors in cleaning up hazardous wastes); see supra notes 20 & 22 and accompanying
text.
36. In G. CALABRESI, THE CosTS OF ACCIDENTS 35-129 (1970), the author suggests that the
party who can most cheaply avoid costs should be the one to bear the risk of loss. When parties are
risk-averse, the party best able to bear or to insure against the risk should be held liable.
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ing, to monitor investments, and to police debtors' activities in order to
protect their collateral.3" They bargain for these privileges through loan
agreement covenants. 8 Banks do not monitor technical decisions involving
pollution by examining fluids and discharges, in which banks are presum-
ably unskilled, but rather examine the economic and environmental health
of the company through loan covenants, in which banks are experienced.
Therefore, they can be effective overseers."
Second, lenders are efficient risk spreaders. They assume the costs of
monitoring their investment through interest rates,40 and transfer to bor-
rowers the costs of pre-loan audits. Lenders will prefer to bear the risk of
loss4' and ensure against "releases or threatened releases" of hazardous
substances to satisfy due diligence requirements under the innocent land-
owner defense.42 If debtors bore the risk of cleanup costs, lenders would
still assume the risk that the debtor might underinsure or become insol-
vent.43 Unless borrowers can get lower rates themselves, they will be in-
different towards paying the higher interest rates or transactions costs that
lenders will charge to bear the risk of loss, since the borrowers would have
had to insure against the risk in any event, perhaps at a higher price,44 if
banks did not do so. 45
37. See generally Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92
YALE L.J. 49, 56 (1982) (commercial bank has excellent monitoring ability); Schwartz, Security In-
terests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 11 n.28
(1981) (bank can learn of important changes in debtor's affairs).
38. See Simpson, The Drafting of Loan Agreements: A Borrower's Viewpoint, 28 Bus. LAW.
1161, 1177-88 (1973) (function of restrictive loan covenants is to maintain or improve ratio between
debt and assets that exists at time financing extended). Through covenants, lenders can require bor-
rowers to conduct environmental audits to ensure that no contamination problems exist; submit copies
of notices received on environmental law violations or commencement of litigation; notify the lenders
of significant changes in the use or operations of the property that may have an environmental impact;
and clean up hazardous substances upon discovery. Kane & Morrel, Environmental Risk Manage-
ment, SECURED LENDER, Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 23, 26; see also Cahan, Environmental Wastes: The
New Risk in Secured Lending, LENDING FOR COM. BANKER, Summer 1987, at 32, 38.
39. Cf Comment, The Impact of the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act on
the Commercial Lending Industry: A Critical Assessment, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 879, 902 (1987)
(comprehensive national monitoring program not economically feasible undertaking for lenders; even
if feasible, CERCLA liability scheme discourages them from serving as monitors).
40. See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE
L.J. 1143, 1151 (1979) (since interest is price bank charges for use of its money, bank will raise
interest rate to cover increased lending expenses).
41. To avoid duplicating monitoring costs, the lender and borrower will bargain to place the risk
of loss on the party better able to bear or to insure against the risk. See supra note 36.
42. See, e.g., Climate for Real Estate Lawyers 'Gloomy' Due to Environmental Liability, ABA
Told, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1106 (Aug. 21, 1987) (lenders should investigate sites themselves to limit
risks and to help themselves in potential court defense).
43. See Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances
and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 706-11, 718-19 (1985) (firms lack
incentive to insure fully when risks unknowable and liability exposure greatly exceeds their wealth).
44. See infra note 49 and accompanying text (high cost of insurance).
45. Smaller banks, such as savings and loans, could also monitor and spread risks, although their
ability to do so would vary directly with their size. See Levmore, supra note 37, at 56 n.30. Smaller
banks could still study a company's entire business plans and operations before lending, and obtain
and evaluate information about a debtor's post-loan behavior. See Schwartz, supra note 37, at 11
n.28. The expected monitoring costs of any creditor, large or small, would vary inversely with the
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Lenders are better monitors than the federal government and insurance
companies. Although the federal government effectively spreads risks
through taxation, the Superfund budget is limited.46 Also, the work of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) focuses primarily on response
actions, and identification and preliminary assessments of potentially dan-
gerous hazardous waste sites that will need Fund-financed cleanup efforts.
The EPA budget for Superfund enforcement activities for 1989 is only
$10.3 million.' Accordingly, the EPA is limited in its monitoring capabil-
ities. Even if it had the budget and personnel to oversee the thousands of
potential Superfund sites across the country, its ability to organize itself to
monitor effectively is doubtful. 8 Finally, the EPA does not have the infor-
mational advantages that lenders have in monitoring particular properties
to ensure compliance with environmental statutes and regulations. Be-
cause of the close debtor-creditor relationship, the lender can better help
rescue debtors from potential environmental problems, while the EPA fo-
cuses on sites in need of cleanup.
Insurance companies can be effective monitors because they spread risks
through premiums and are experts in collecting and evaluating informa-
tion about the insured. Insurance for environmental liability, however, is
expensive and difficult to obtain.'" Moreover, if lenders are to have debt-
ors obtain insurance, they still assume the risk that debtors will misbe-
have,5" become insolvent, or underinsure.51
informational advantage the creditor has in assessing a debtor's behavior. See Jackson & Kronman,
supra note 40, at 1159-61 & n.62. The costs of monitoring would be passed on to the debtor, since
the debtor would pay the lender for the benefit of being monitored.
Levmore observes that in a two-party transaction, the lender will monitor "as long as his cost of
doing so is less than his expected benefit." Levmore, supra note 37, at 49. When many potential
lenders/monitors exist, with overlapping interests, the problem of "freeriding"-whereby one lender
will seek to reduce monitoring costs by relying on the efforts of others-could lead to undermonitor-
ing. Also, overlapping interests could lead to duplicative efforts, and thus overmonitoring. Id.
46. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SUMMARY OF THE 1989 BUDGET 5 (1988) (1989
Superfund budget estimated at $1.7 billion).
47. Id. at 58 (EPA expects to oversee "70 remedial design and 35 remedial actions conducted by
[responsible parties.]").
48. See, e.g., OTA Blames Superfund Problems on Management as House Subcommittee Plans to
Review Program, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 219 (June 17, 1988) (congressional study criticizes EPA's
management capabilities); Office of Technology Assessment Pans EPA for 'Inefficient' Implementa-
tion of Superfund, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2524, 2524-25 (Apr. 22, 1988) ("biggest cross-cutting prob-
lem facing superfund implementation . . . is a workforce which is largely inexperienced, untrained,
and characterized by high turnover rates ... little incentive exists at EPA to produce quality work
and there is minimal quality assurance"); see also EPA Inspector General's Office Superfund Audit
Finds Poor Work by States, Little EPA Oversight, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 379 (July 22, 1988) (EPA
regional offices have not adequately monitored Superfund cleanups performed by states under cooper-
ative agreements with EPA).
49. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 23, at 12, 28, 40 (insurers maintain
that inability to predict losses has made pollution risks uninsurable; many treatment, storage, and
disposal facilities and generators are operating without insurance).
50. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 40, at 1150-51 n.36 ("insuring against the danger of
debtor misbehavior does nothing, by itself, to reduce the likelihood of its occurrence" and does not
impinge on creditor's incentive to monitor) (emphasis in original).
51. Lenders also assume the risk that courts will interpret the insurance contract in favor of the
insurance company so that a financially troubled debtor may end up bearing all cleanup costs. See
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II. A PROPOSED STANDARD TO INTERPRET THE MEANING OF
MANAGEMENT PARTICIPATION
A. Selecting an Existing Standard to Serve as a Guide
Given that certainty is required to encourage lenders to monitor the
waste sites of their debtors,52 courts should look to existing lender liability
standards to give shape to the meaning of "participating in the manage-
ment" under CERCLA. Of the various lender liability doctrines available,
those dealing with a lender's "control" of its borrower are appropriate in
determining the extent to which the lender may monitor the site of its
debtor.53 Equitable subordination and alter ego5" are the preferred doc-
trines involving lender control to provide such a standard to interpret
management participation. 5 First, the doctrines provide reasonable cer-
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 23, at 54-73 (contract interpretation of pollution cover-
age limits unsettled).
52. Clarity of legal standards is one factor that affects a lender's decision to extend credit and to
monitor; magnitude of liability is another. The latter, however, is difficult to assess because environ-
mental audits produce inherent uncertainties. See Cahan, supra note 38, at 37.
53. Those theories involving good faith, or lack thereof, do not accurately represent the relation-
ship between lender and borrower contemplated in interpreting lender management participation
under CERCLA. Those theories are less immediately applicable than "control" theories because they
focus on whether banks were deceptive or dishonest when exercising rights under loan agreements.
See, e.g., Tyler, Emerging Theories of Lender Liability in Texas, 24 Hous. L. REv. 411, 413-31
(1987) (discussing expanding duty of good faith). For example, cases under the holder-in-due-course
doctrine often involve unconscionable credit contracts and waiver of defense clauses with respect to
consumer purchasers. See McDonnell, Freedom from Claims and Defenses: A Study in Judicial Ac-
tivism Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 GA. L. REv. 569, 600-08 (1983) (discussing good
faith and notice under holder-in-due-course doctrine). Thus the analysis of whether the third-party
financier and seller were sufficiently "closely connected" to be a single enterprise under the holder-in-
due-course theory, so that the financier would be liable for losses resulting from the seller's miscon-
duct, does not serve as an appropriate framework to discern the scope of management participation
under CER(LA.
This is not to say that banks liable under "control" theories cannot be liable under doctrines involv-
ing fair play. See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(corporate debtor establishes cause of action for damages against creditors for fraud and duress as well
as interference with business relations). Also, lenders not liable under a "control" theory could be
liable for lack of good faith. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985)
(lender's power to demand repayment under financing agreement provision limited by obligation of
good faith, even though indebtedness payable on demand). This Note, however, focuses on a standard
for interpreting the ambiguous phrase, "participating in the management," and thus primarily re-
quires an examination of lender "control" theories-whereby the "exercise of control over the day to
day operations or management of a borrower... can result in legal consequences." Tyler, supra, at
431.
54. Equitable subordination applies to bankruptcy proceedings in which creditors of the debtor
request the court to subordinate the claim of a dominating creditor that engaged in inequitable con-
duct. Creditors also may request that courts use the doctrine of alter ego to pierce the corporate veil of
an insolvent company controlled by a lender to satisfy creditors' claims.
55. Other lender "control" theories, such as agency, tortious interference, and limited partnership,
are less applicable as a standard to interpret management participation under CERCLA. Agency
theory does not seem appropriate because cases applying it usually involve trade creditors; thus it is
easier to find common interests and identity of goals between the principal and the agent. See, e.g., A.
Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981) (agency relationship estab-
lished between grain dealer and local grain elevator). The theory of tortious interference does not
provide the certainty that a standard for interpreting management participation needs. See Note, Eq-
uitable Subordination and Analogous Theories of Lender Liability: Toward a New Model of "Con-
trol," 65 TEx. L. REv. 801, 844 (1987) ("tortious interference has not yet 'developed a crystallized
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tainty since they have been applied consistently by courts.56 Second, the
doctrines are appropriate in determining the scope of management partici-
pation because they have been applied to cases drawing the gray line be-
tween a lender's legitimate management of a loan and its excessive control
of the borrower's activities. Cases under these doctrines reveal both consis-
tent fact patterns that have been considered appropriate lender behavior
and activities that have led courts to find a control relationship in which
the creditor dominated the debtor. Because a lender generally does not
wish to operate the debtor's business,57 but may take steps to protect its
loan when the debtor experiences financial difficulties, courts will invoke
the doctrine of equitable subordination or alter ego if they find that the
lender exercised control that amounted to total domination of the debtor.
B. Total Domination as an Available Interpretation
Although a standard of total domination appears to be more restrictive
than a literal interpretation of the words "participating in the manage-
ment," an approach that looks to the lender's cumulative behavior by fo-
cusing on total control is a plausible method of construing management
participation. Because legislative history does not provide any clues on
what lender activities constitute management participation, and confusion
exists concerning what lenders can do without "participating in the man-
agement," the term is ambiguous and thus open to a variety of
interpretations.
First, a construction of total control is consistent with, and advances,
Congress' goal of encouraging private parties to engage in surveillance of
pollution conditions and safer disposal practices.5"
Second, because a lender whose activities constitute "participating in
the management" of the facility under the statute would incur liability as
an operator, the security interest exemption only makes sense if manage-
set of definite rules' "). The doctrine of limited partnership also does not provide the certainty this
standard requires. See Basile, Limited Liability for Limited Partners: An Argument for the Abolition
of the Control Rule, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1199, 1221 (1985) ("Both academicians and practitioners
have bemoaned the control rule's inherent uncertainty."). The small number of cases involving the
liability of lenders of construction loans have not provided clear rules for developing a standard. Com-
pare Smith v. Continental Bank, 130 Ariz. 320, 636 P.2d 98 (1981) (no bank liability) with Connor
v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal.2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (bank
liability).
56. See infra notes 74 & 86.
57. A lender may wish to operate the debtor's business if it has an equity interest in the debtor. A
discussion of when equity risk financings are investments rather than debt is beyond the scope of this
Note.
58. 131 CONG. REc. 812,031 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1985) (statement of Sen. Evans) (major objective
of Superfund is to "provide an incentive to those who manage hazardous substances or are responsible
for contaminated sites to avoid releases and to make the maximum effort to clean up or mitigate the
effects of any such release"); id. at S12,008 (statement of Sen. Domenici) ("we must provide incen-
tives for the Government and private parties to join together rather than litigate"); see supra note 15
and accompanying text (innocent landowner defense acts as means of creating incentives for safer
waste handling and disposal).
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ment participation encompasses at a minimum activities that would lead
to operator liability under the general liability scheme. To interpret the
term as something less than those actions that would lead to liability as an
operator would be illogical, since banks would be more susceptible to lia-
bility under the carved-out exemption than under the general liability
scheme.
An examination of the legislative history 9 and court interpretations of
the term "operator" shows that an operator is one who is in charge of or
controls the operations at a facility. In applying CERCLA, courts have
held persons who were in charge of or controlled hazardous waste disposal
practices liable as operators.60 Of course, these persons were not banks,
but rather shareholders and executive officers of businesses that managed
hazardous wastes. They had the capacity and general responsibility as ex-
ecutive officers to plan and implement disposal practices; naturally, they
could be considered "owners or operators." Yet even with respect to a
parent corporation that controlled the management and operation of its
subsidiary, one court indicated that "care must be taken so that 'normal'
activities of a parent with respect to its subsidiary do not automatically
warrant finding the parent an owner or operator." 1 This dictum indi-
cates that a higher standard of participation is needed before a parent
corporation would be found liable as an "owner or operator" of a subsidi-
ary's facility. The requirement for management participation of a bank
should be at least as high as the participation required of a parent corpo-
rationor similar entity. The security interest exemption only makes sense
59. The legislative history states:
Operators of vessels do not include those individuals who are not totally responsible for the
operation of a vessel. To fall within the definition, the individual must have assumed the full
range of operational responsibility. For example, a pilot might be in charge of navigation of a
vessel for a short duration, yet he does not meet the definition of "operator", since he neither
mans nor supplies the vessel. In the case of a facility, an "operator" is defined to be a person
who is carrying out operational functions for the owner of the facility pursuant to an appropri-
ate agreement.
H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 36-37, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 6160, 6181-82. Although the House Report distinguishes operators of vessels from
operators of facilities, the essence of the meaning of "operator" is being "in charge of," "in control
of," or "responsible for" the full range of operations at a vessel or facility.
60. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) (Stockholder/
corporate officer was "in charge of the operation of the facility... and as such is an 'operator' within
the meaning of CERCLA .... [A] corporate officer who controls corporate conduct and thus is an
active individual participant in that conduct is liable for the torts of the corporation."); Edward Hines
Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 657 (N.D. Ill.) (designer and builder of
treatment system at site containing facility not "operator" of site; "[o]nly those who actually operate
or exercise control over the facility that creates an environmental risk can be held liable [as operator]
under CERCLA;" although defendant enjoyed right of access, occasionally was present at facility, and
trained personnel to operate facility, such does not provide evidence that defendant "ever operated
.. . facility or, more significantly, exercised any control over" disposal process), affd, 861 F.2d 155
(7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823,
848-49 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (president and vice president who were also major stockholders of firm
were "in charge" of plant), affd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 146 (1987).
61. Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986).
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if management participation is not construed literally to mean participa-
tion in any management activity, but held to at least the same standard of
"being in charge" or "in control" that would lead to "operator" liability
under the general liability scheme.
A standard of total control would not likely decrease a bank's incentive
to investigate sites prior to lending;62 instead, it would encourage banks to
monitor the debtor's hazardous waste activities during the loan.63 Never-
theless, because a standard of total domination might decrease a bank's
incentive to investigate before lending, courts could condition application
of commercial law standards to determine lender liability upon a showing
of pre-loan environmental due diligence.
Courts may find it difficult to interpret "participating in the manage-
ment" as total control given the phrase's broad connotations when read
literally. While Congress could help matters by clarifying the term
through amendment, such action is unlikely. Instead, the EPA could issue
an interpretative rule that recognizes the importance of bank monitoring
of hazardous waste sites, and that supports a cumulative approach for
determining whether the lender controlled the debtor. 4
A cumulative approach that looks to total control is preferable to a
bright-line test, since it provides courts with flexibility to address the cir-
cumstances of each case. Cumulative behavior analysis can be performed
by applying the standards currently employed under the equitable subor-
dination and alter ego theories of lender liability to determine when lend-
ers have overreached in protecting their security interests. Although this
approach is flexible, it still provides predictability because courts have ap-
plied consistently these commercial law standards of lender liability.
C. Equitable Subordination
Bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, have used subordination65 as an
equitable remedy against fraud and breach of fiduciary duties owed to a
62. A bank's incentive to extend credit is inversely related to the need to monitor during the loan
term. The borrower, however, has an incentive to increase the riskiness of the loan after the interest
rate has been set by banks, since, by doing so, "he effectively obtains a higher-risk loan at an interest
rate reflecting the lower risk level anticipated by the creditor when the loan was made." Jackson &
Kronman, supra note 40, at 1149. Banks cannot always predict before lending how debtors may
behave during the loan term. Thus, they will monitor debtors' operations to prevent misbehavior and
to protect their security interests until monitoring costs exceed the possible increase in risk.
63. While a standard of total control could encourage lenders to help revive debtors by extending
funds for cleanup and to allow for later recovery, not all banks are good Samaritans, nor does CER-
CLA, as it stands now, require them to be. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,997 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (nothing under CEROLA suggests that lenders are obligated
to advance funds for purpose of cleanup, or to ensure that loan proceeds are applied to cleanup costs).
64. While interpretative rules do not bind courts, they "do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
65. Under bankruptcy's priority scheme, subordination is the act or process by which the claims
of the misbehaving creditor are ranked below the claims of those creditors that were disadvantaged by
the misbehaving creditor's inequitable conduct. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTrCY 510.05 (L. King
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bankrupt corporation.66 To order the subordination of claims, the court
must find that (1) the claimant engaged in inequitable conduct, and (2)
the misconduct resulted in injury to the bankrupt's creditors or conferred
an unfair advantage on the claimant.17 This two-pronged standard has
been referred to as the "Mobile Steel test."' "B
The type of alleged inequitable conduct found in subordination cases
usually involves either fraud or breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the
bankrupt corporation.69 The doctrine is not limited to fiduciaries who are
shareholders, officers, and directors of bankrupt companies, but applies to
any person who acted in a fiduciary capacity, breached a fiduciary duty,
and caused claimants to whom a duty was owed to suffer to their detri-
ment.7 0 Because a creditor is not ordinarily a fiduciary of either his debtor
or his fellow creditors, the standard of misconduct for a non-insider credi-
tor that must be demonstrated to justify subordination is quite
substantial. 1
A creditor may be considered a fiduciary of his debtor and be held ac-
countable for his actions if he exercises control over the debtor's decision-
making processes that amounts to domination of the debtor's will.72 Com-
mentators have classified degrees of lender control into categories of voting
control, management control, and financial domination to indicate the cir-
cumstances that have and have not led to subordination.7 3 While financial
domination does not lead to a finding of control, voting control and man-
agement control may warrant subordination if the creditor exercises that
control to the point where the debtor can make no independent deci-
sions.74 This Note proposes that courts examine the kinds of behavior that
15th ed. 1979 & Supp. 1988).
66. Equitable subordination was first recognized in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) (wage
claims of dominant shareholder subordinated to claims of disadvantaged corporate creditor).
67. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977). The
claims may be equitably subordinated only to the extent necessary to offset any unfair advantage or
harm suffered on account of inequitable conduct. Id. at 701.
68. The test was codified in the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2586
(1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1982)).
69. Persons in control of a corporation owe fiduciary duties to their corporation and possibly to
other shareholders, since they are in positions of trust. Fiduciaries owe "undivided loyalty," and must
act honestly and in good faith for the corporation's benefit. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss ENTERPRISES § 235, at 625-28 (3d ed. 1983).
70. In re W.T. Grant Co., 4 Bankr. 53, 74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd sub noma. Cosoff v.
Rodman, 20 Bankr. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 699 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822
(1983).
71. 4 Bankr. at 74-75. This Note focuses on fiduciary duty, not fraud, on the part of non-
management creditors.
72. See Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc. v. Hessen (In re Teltronics Serv., Inc.), 29 Bankr. 139, 170
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983).
73. See, e.g., Douglas-Hamilton, When are Creditors in Control of Debtor Companies?, PRAC.
LAW., Oct. 15, 1980, at 61; Note, supra note 55, at 821-22.
74. The doctrine may be viewed as imprecise because courts have employed a "cumulative test"
approach. See, e.g., In re Beverages Int'l Ltd., 50 Bankr. 273, 284-85 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (cu-
mulative weight of evidence supported finding of impropriety); 124 CONG. REC. H32,398 (daily ed.
Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (Congress recognized need for flexibility in applying
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have been considered "inequitable conduct" to meet the first element of
the Mobile Steel test in interpreting management participation under
CERCLA 5
1. Financial Domination
Courts have found that lenders exercising financial domination76 over a
debtor have not engaged in inequitable conduct so as to warrant subordi-
nation of their claims. Financial domination ordinarily does not elevate
the lender to "insider" status because the right to control the debtor finan-
cially is inherent in most debtor-creditor relationships. Illustrations of fi-
nancial domination include offering business advice and insisting on its
implementation, exercising daily monitoring activities, and exacting debtor
concessions. 7 Accordingly, banks lending to waste disposal firms should
be free to perform these kinds of monitoring activities to protect their col-
lateral. They should be free to offer suggestions to improve the safety of
debtors' disposal practices, threaten to declare defaults if debtors engage in
doctrine to enable courts to deal appropriately with inequitable or fraudulent conduct, and left to
courts development of principle of equitable subordination). Although the doctrine does not provide
complete certainty, it does provide a sophisticated analysis to determine excessive control by focusing
on the lender's cumulative behavior to see whether the lender completely dominated the policy and
business practices of the debtor. See, e.g., DeNatale & Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable Subordina-
tion as Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 Bus. LAW. 417, 429 (1985) (application of equita-
ble subordination to claims of nonmanagement creditors has not resulted in abuse of flexibility). Also,
subordination cases present consistent fact patterns of activities that have not led to a finding of con-
trol. Id. at 444-45 (creditor given broad license to monitor debtor's activities before being deemed in
control).
75. Because harm to third parties is not required to trigger CERCLA liability, see supra note 4
and accompanying text (liability under CERCLA determined by whether defendant falls within class
of potentially responsible parties and whether certain conditions are met), the second element-injury
to other claimants-is unnecessary. The doctrine of equitable subordination requires the second ele-
ment of the Mobile Steel test because bankruptcy law involves ranking of payments among creditors.
When a bankruptcy court finds that a creditor has acted unfairly by improving his position vis-a-vis
other claimants pre-bankruptcy, the court will subordinate his claim to those claimants who were
disadvantaged. See 3 CoLImER oN BANKRUPTCY, supra note 65, % 510.05.
76. Financial domination is the power to influence those who have voting or management control
of the debtor by suggesting ways in which the debtor can improve its financial performance. Douglas-
Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting from Improper Interference with the Management of a Fi-
nancially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAW. 343, 345 (1975); Note, supra note 55, at 822.
77. For example, the court in In re W.T. Grant Co., 4 Bankr. 53, 75 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980),
held that a creditor would not be subject to equitable subordination if it exercises a significant degree
of daily monitoring, goes to lengths to aid a debtor, and tries to help the debtor keep intact his
business so long as no other creditors are harmed. The court reasoned that equitable subordination
was an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly, and the burden of proof was substantial, particu-
larly with respect to non-insiders. Id. at 74-75. See also Zimmerman v. Central Penn Nat'l Bank (In
re Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co.), 46 Bankr. 125, 129 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (creditor that monitored
debtor's finances on daily basis and threatened to declare default did not behave in fiduciary capacity);
Bank of New Richmond v. Production Credit Ass'n (In re Osborne), 42 Bankr. 988, 997 (W.D. Wis.
1984) (that secured creditor gave debtor directions on how to spend loan funds did not give rise to
control that would justify subordination); Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc. v. Hessen (In re Teltronics Servs.,
Inc.), 29 Bankr. 139, 172 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (loan agreements requiring debtor to purchase
equipment from creditor and restricting outside secured financing were entered into at arm's length;
lender's imposition of C.O.D. payment terms, refusal to provide additional guaranteed financing, and
input into debtor's budgetary matters stemmed from sound business judgment and were within debtor-
creditor relationship).
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illegal disposal practices or fail to correct risky ones, and demand that
loan proceeds be spent on waste reduction equipment. By allowing lenders
to influence policies or business practices in this way, courts can en-
courage lenders to monitor the waste sites of their debtors.
2. Management Control
In applying the doctrine of equitable subordination, courts may find
that a lender engaged in inequitable conduct if it exercised management
control78 that amounted to total domination of the debtor.7 9 Thus, under
CERCLA, a lender would have engaged in inequitable conduct if it indi-
rectly controlled the borrower's disposal policies and practices by hiring
and firing the company's directors, dictating who would be its officers or
employees, or exercising veto powers over its business decisions. For ex-
ample, one court has applied equitable subordination when a bank's deci-
sions forced the execution of security agreements in inventory and equip-
ment; determined which of the debtor's creditors would be paid with an
eye towards enhancing previously existing security interests; compelled the
termination of employees; cut officer salaries; and failed to honor payroll
checks.80 On the other hand, the injection of bank personnel or consultants
into the debtor company to assist in its affairs will not give rise to a fidu-
ciary relationship without a showing of undue influence or coercion.81 A
bank also may exercise leverage over the debtor's business operations to
restore the firm's profitability if the bank's demands are not forced upon
the debtor.82 Because loan covenants can grant lenders an extensive degree
of management control, courts should focus on whether the control was
actually exercised and amounted to improper coercion. 83
78. Management control is financial domination plus indirect control of the debtor that imposes a
fiduciary standard of conduct on the bank. Illustrations of indirect control include supervising the day-
to-day operations of the debtor, controlling the debtor's assets, and injecting management consultants
or bank personnel into the debtor company.
79. Management control in itself is not improper if the creditor uses that control to help an ailing
company become financially stable. See Soriano & Lockett, supra note 34, at 59 (lender often ap-
points consultant to assist financially distressed borrower in managing affairs, requests debtor to hire
new management, and suggests ways to improve operations and cut costs as part of normal workout
procedures between creditor and debtor). The inequity lies in management control that is coercive and
that interferes with the debtor's autonomy.
80. Bergquist v. First Nat'l Bank of St. Paul (In re American Lumber Co.), 5 Bankr. 470, 478
(D. Minn. 1980).
81. Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Keig (In re Prima Co.), 98 F.2d 952, 964-65 (7th Cir.
1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 658 (1939). Prima does not involve equitable subordination, but ad-
dresses the level of control a creditor must exercise to subject itself to a fiduciary standard of review.
82. In re Technology for Energy Corp., 56 Bankr. 307, 313-17 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985)
(lender's conduct not inequitable, since bank did not control debtor's contract, personnel, production
schedule, or purchase order decisions; lockbox agreement not sufficient to establish control; debtor still
scheduled and established priorities of accounts payable; consultant not needlessly thrust upon debtor;
bank did not control newly appointed CEO; and debtor had legal counsel throughout debtor-creditor
relationship).
83. See, e.g., Fruehauf Corp. v. T.E. Mercer Trucking Co. (In re T.E. Mercer Trucking Co.),
16 Bankr. 176, 189-90 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981) (loan covenants merely suggested that debtors were
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A lender should be encouraged to use its leverage to encourage work-
outs and to restore the profitable operations of the debtor, rather than to
resort immediately to its right to declare a default. If a lender can engage
in workout procedures without fear of being deemed an operator under
CERCLA, it may postpone default declaration and recommend consul-
tants to help the debtor manage finances. Neither the lender nor the bank
agent benefits by cutting the debtor's operating costs to the point where
disposal practices are risky, since the lender may lose the value of the
security interest if a release occurs.8 4 Banks, then, can help debtors solve
financial problems before those problems lead to risky disposal practices.
Courts can encourage banks to monitor hazardous waste sites by inter-
preting management participation as total domination of their debtors,
rather than focusing on individual activities related to management in
which banks or their agents engaged.
3. Voting Control
Courts may find the lender in direct control of the debtor for purposes
of equitable subordination if it exercised its voting power through a pledge
of stock to elect directors who shape and implement the debtor's policies.8"
Potential voting control is relevant under CERCLA because a bank may
hold as collateral a pledge of stock of a debtor that handles hazardous
wastes. As a pledgee, however, the lender does not have an automatic
right to vote the stock; its right to vote is contingent upon default. Thus,
potential voting power should' not give rise to liability as an "owner or
operator" of the debtor.
D. Alter Ego
Cases applying the alter ego doctrine to debtor-creditor relationships
also provide guidance for determining the bounds of appropriate lender
behavior under CERCLA.8" Courts may invoke the equitable remedy of
instrumentalities of creditor; further evidentiary hearings necessary to discover whether creditor exer-
cised right of control).
84. See supra note 16 (describing problems lenders could face if they held an interest in contami-
nated collateral).
85. Compare Unsecured Creditors' Comms. of Pacific Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial Fund-
ing Corp. (In re Pacific Express, Inc.), 69 Bankr. 112, 117-18 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986) (loan partici-
pants holding 65% of debtor's stock pursuant to "equity sweetener" of loan agreement did not have
sufficient control over debtor to be fiduciaries) and In re Technology, 56 Bankr. 307, 316 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1985) (lender attained voting control as pledgee of stock, but never exercised that control)
with In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333, 348 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (bankrupt was alter ego
of creditor through latter's holding of 90% of debtor's stock and control of income; creditor was in
substance bankrupt's owner and used power to make transactions that disadvantaged other creditors),
rev'd on other grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967).
86. Although the doctrine of alter ego does not offer bright lines to determine permissible lender
activities, it-like the doctrine of equitable subordination-does provide a sophisticated analysis to
find excessive control based on total domination of the debtor.
The degree of control needed to substantiate an alter ego claim is high, and courts accordingly have
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alter ego if they find that the dominant corporation, usually the parent
firm, (1) controlled the subservient one, and (2) proximately caused the
plaintiff harm through misuse of that control.87 In cases involving alleged
alter ego in debtor-creditor relationships, actual, total control is necessary
to meet the first element of the test.88 Thus, the two-pronged test under
alter ego resembles the two-part standard of Mobile Steel. Moreover, both
tests require total domination of the debtor to trigger a finding of im-
proper control.89 As with the analysis of equitable subordination cases to
determine lender management participation under CERCLA, courts re-
ferring to the alter ego doctrine need only examine the standards devel-
oped to find whether the test's first element-total domination-is met."
Cases applying the doctrine of alter ego support the argument that fi-
nancial domination should not lead to a finding of excessive control to
hold the creditor liable for the debtor's obligations. 1 The cases also
strengthen the proposition that management control is proper short of co-
ercion. For example, courts have required "actual, operative, total con-
trol"9' 2 or total surrender of debtors' management control" for lenders to
be liable under the instrumentality theory. These cases show that a higher
been reluctant to impose liability under this theory. See Lundgren, Liability of a Creditor in a Con-
trol Relationship with Its Debtor, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 523, 533 (1984) ("courts recognize the practical
necessities that arise when creditors are confronted with debtors in financial distress" and may feel "it
is worthwhile to permit creditors to take relatively strong measures ... to protect the creditor's debt
rather than adopt a rule which would have the effect of forcing creditors to seek premature liquidation
or bankruptcy proceedings"). Similarly, courts in equitable subordination cases have given lenders
broad license to monitor the activities of their borrowers before they are deemed to be in control. See
supra note 74.
87. Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1103 (5th
Cir. 1973).
88. Id. at 1105.
89. With respect to voting control, alter ego requires more than outright stock ownership to trig-
ger liability. This requirement is logical because the dominating company, often the parent, owns
stock in the subsidiary. See, e.g., Owl Fumigating Corp. v. California Cyanide Co., 30 F.2d 812 (3d
Cir. 1929) (loan, stock ownership, and identity of officers do not establish identity of corporations).
When the doctrine is applied to a non-management creditor, not mere ownership but unrestricted
ownership of the debtor's stock is required as indicia of control of the debtor. See Riquelme Valdes v.
Leisure Resource Group, Inc., 810 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1987) (lender's 100% ownership of debtor
stock was not sine qua non of alter ego status, as stock was committed to escrow agent, and lender
was prevented from exercising prerogatives of stock ownership pursuant to agreement).
90. Because harm to third parties is not a prerequisite to CERCLA liability, the proposed test
eliminates the need to place blame that is required in the alter ego context, and looks solely at over-
reaching lender actions.
91. See Krivo, 483 F.2d at 1107-12 (creditor not liable under alter ego; capacity to exert great
pressure and influence on debtor inherent in creditor-debtor relationship).
92. Id. at 1109; see also Riquelme Valdes, 810 F.2d at 1355 (lockbox account for receivables not
ipso facto proof of control over debtor; veto power in limited sense does not amount to domination);
Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Boatman's Bank, 234 F. 41 (8th Cir. 1916) (bank's holding of pledge
of debtor's stock and installation of agent as president of debtor are part of legitimate and customary
practice of keeping oversight over business, management, and operations of financially troubled
debtor); James E. McFadden, Inc. v. Baltimore Contractors, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(loan terms do not transfer total control to creditor).
93. See, e.g., Credit Managers Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 51 Cal. App. 3d 352, 124 Cal. Rptr. 242
(1975) (plaintiff, alleging that bank compelled debtor to employ bank agent as its business consultant
and to surrender complete management control, had pleaded sufficient facts to state cause of action
that fiduciary duty was owed and breached).
1989] Lender Management Under CERCLA
standard of control-complete domination-is required for non-
management creditors than for shareholders, directors, or officers of the
controlled corporation. By interpreting management participation as total
control over the debtor, courts could encourage lenders to monitor sites to
protect their investments and, as an incident to exercising their bargained-
for rights, to play an active role in deterring unsafe disposal practices.
CONCLUSION
Examination of the circumstances that have and have not led to lender
liability under equitable subordination and alter ego can provide creditors
with a clearer framework of acceptable patterns of behavior when deter-
mining the extent to which they may assist debtors that handle hazardous
wastes. To determine whether the lender participated in the management
of the debtor, courts should look to the kinds of behavior that have been
considered "inequitable" under the first prong of the Mobile Steel test, or
to "total, participatory, actual" control under the first element of the alter
ego standard. Under either approach, 4 the court should find that total
control amounting to ownership is what exposes the creditor to liability."
Liability should be triggered not just by nominal activities that appear to
give creditors management or voting control, but rather by actual exercise
of such control that amounts to coercion, and, in effect, actual ownership.
To ensure that banks will continue to investigate debtor sites prior to
lending, the proposed standard of liability will apply only upon a showing
that the bank conducted pre-loan environmental due diligence. 96
The proposed interpretation of the words "participating in the manage-
94. Either approach will suffice, since courts will be looking at a standard of total domination.
See, e.g., In re Beverages Int'l Ltd., 50 Bankr. 273 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (creditor's use of debtor
as alter ego is sufficient inequitable conduct to warrant subordination); DeNatale & Abram, supra
note 74, at 443 (indicia of control in instrumentality cases are relevant for determining control for
equitable subordination).
95. Of course, if the lender exercises its right to elect directors or to receive dividends through a
holding of stock, it will be liable as the owner of the debtor. Similarly, the mortgagee in United States
v. Nicolet, who is also the former controlling stockholder of the polluter, is not a typical non-insider
creditor but the former parent of the polluting company. United States' Memorandum in Support of
Its Second Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint at 18, United States v. Nicolet, No. 85-3060 (E.D.
Pa. filed Nov. 22, 1988). As a former parent, the company may be held to a broader, more appropri-
ate standard which looks to whether it "had the capaity... to make decisions and implement actions
and mechanisms to prevent and abate the damage caused by the disposal and releases of hazardous
wastes at the facility." Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986) (emphasis
added).
96. The kinds of activities that have been considered proper and improper under equitable subor-
dination and alter ego support the factual findings made by the court in United States v. Mirabile, 15
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985). For example, the activities of the foreclosing
mortgagee that were regarded as prudent and routine steps to secure the property, see supra note 31
and accompanying text, are illustrations of financial control under the doctrines of equitable subordi-
nation and alter ego. The activities of the secured creditor whose motion for summary judgment was
denied are consistent with those described as management control under these doctrines. Moreover,
the denial of summary judgment supports the proposed standard's argument that a finding of control
that rivals ownership is needed to trigger liability, and that activities that appear to comprise manage-
ment participation are not sufficient in themselves to warrant such a finding.
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ment" in CERCLA's security interest exemption will provide certainty
and encourage efficient bank monitoring by holding lenders liable as oper-
ators only if they totally dominated the debtor's business practices. Policy
objectives under CERCLA demand this interpretation because it will en-
courage lenders to monitor their debtors' sites. Monitoring will serve the
dual purposes of protecting the lenders' investments and bargained-for
rights, and promoting CERCLA's policy goals, as lenders can detect po-
tential financial problems that may lead to risky disposal practices and
help solve those problems before releases or threatened releases of hazard-
ous substances occur. An interpretation of management participation as
total domination that amounts to ownership, thereby making bank expo-
sure to liability minimal, will encourage lenders to monitor during the
loan term, maintain the debtors' enterprises as going concerns, extend the
capital needed to clean up sites or install anti-pollution measures, and
recover the debt when their borrowers' economic and environmental
health is more stable.
